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The shortage of transplant kidneys has spurred debate
about legalizing monetary payments to donors to in-
crease the number of available kidneys. However, buy-
ing and selling organs faces widespread disapproval.
We survey a representative sample of Americans to
assess disapproval for several forms of kidney mar-
ket, and to understand why individuals disapprove by
identifying factors that predict disapproval, including
disapproval of markets for other body parts, dislike of
increased scope for markets and distrust of markets
generally. Our results suggest that while the public is
potentially receptive to compensating kidney donors,
among those who oppose it, general disapproval to-
ward certain kinds of transactions is at least as impor-
tant as concern about specific policy details. Between
51% and 63% of respondents approve of the various
potential kidney markets we investigate, and between
42% and 58% want such markets to be legal. A total of
38% of respondents disapprove of at least one market.
Respondents who distrust markets generally are not
more disapproving of kidney markets; however we find
significant correlations between kidney market disap-
proval and attitudes reflecting disapproval toward cer-
tain transactions—including both other body markets
and market encroachment into traditionally nonmarket
exchanges, such as food preparation.
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Introduction
The demand for transplantable kidneys exceeds the supply.
If kidneys were a purchased commodity, the gap between
supply and demand would mean the price was too low. But
in most countries, a market for organs is regarded as ‘re-
pugnant’ (1), and such markets are widely illegal. We use
‘repugnant’ in its economic sense—in a repugnant transac-
tion the participants are willing to transact, but third parties
disapprove and wish to prevent the transaction (rather than
in its psychological sense of eliciting disgust among poten-
tial participants). Hence repugnant transactions are often
illegal (1).
This repugnance concerns monetary purchase of kidneys,
not ‘kidney exchange’ between incompatible patient–
donor pairs (2). The National Organ Transplant Act was
amended (3) to clarify the legality of ‘paired donations,’ in-
cluding large impersonal exchanges (4–6). A recent survey
of transplant surgeons reveals majority support for non-
cash incentives, but majority opposition to cash payments
(7). A recent survey of economists found a substantial ma-
jority supports such payments (8). Previous surveys of the
public (9) find both opposition (10) and support (11–13) for
cash payments.
There is a vigorous debate whether some kind of regu-
lated monetary market should be legalized. (e.g., a draft
bill proposed by Senator Arlen Specter was rejected by
the National Kidney Foundation). (14) Repugnance is re-
ferred to by both sides (15,16). The Declaration of Is-
tanbul is an international expression of such repugnance
(17).
We surveyed a representative sample of Americans, to in-
vestigate who disapproves of kidney sales, and why. We
investigate three hypotheses about disapproval of kidney
markets. First, it reflects a generalized disapproval of the
‘sale and commoditization of body parts’. Second, it re-
flects a general disapproval of ‘market encroachment on
traditionally nonmarket transactions’, that is repugnance
toward introducing money to transactions previously car-
ried out without money among families and friends. (E.g.
Robin Young, interviewing one of the authors on NPR: ‘I re-
member the first McDonalds coming to our neighborhood
and my mother treated it as if it was some sort of heathen
place. Go somewhere else but home to eat?’) (18) Third, it
reflects ‘distrust of markets generally’.
Materials and Methods
After a brief description of kidney transplantation, we
elicited several measures of disapproval toward kidney
markets. We also presented scenarios capturing disap-
proval of body-related markets and of market intrusion
on traditionally nonmarket interactions. We measured at-
titudes toward markets generally, and collected demo-
graphic information and political affiliation. The full survey




We described four potential kidney markets, varying both
donor type (living vs. deceased) and purchaser type (indi-
vidual vs. government). Respondents rated each market on
a 7-point scale (1 = ‘approve a great deal’ . . . 4 = ‘neither
approve nor disapprove’. . . 7 = ‘disapprove a great deal’).
For example, the scenario describing the individual market
for deceased donations is:
Alan has a serious kidney disease, and needs to have
a kidney transplant. He does not have any friends or
family who would be compatible donors.
Scenario A: Suppose it was legal for individuals to
pay the family of a deceased donor to immediately
receive a donated kidney. Would you approve or dis-
approve of Alan paying for a kidney from a deceased
donor?
The corresponding scenario describing a regulated institu-
tional market involving the government and/or insurance
companies is:
Scenario B: Suppose that the government and/or
health insurance companies were allowed to pay
a standard payment to the family of a deceased
donor. Would you approve or disapprove of such a
program to pay for kidneys from deceased donors?
The two scenarios for living donors are written similarly.
We also asked which markets respondents would want to
be legalized (1 = ‘strongly believe it should be legal’. . . 4
= ‘no opinion’. . . 7 = ‘strongly believe it should be legal’).
Lastly we asked respondents to rank the four markets in
order of acceptability.
Markets for other body parts
If disapproval of kidney markets arises from general aver-
sion to commoditizing bodies, individuals who disapprove
of kidney markets will disapprove of markets for other body
parts. To measure these attitudes we presented scenarios
for paying blood donors, paying a surrogate mother and
purchasing deceased donors. For example, the scenario
describing paying blood donors is:
Background: Orange Diamond is a charity that orga-
nizes blood donations.
Scenario: Since they often don’t have enough
donors, they pay $50 each time a person donates
blood. Do you approve or disapprove of paying
these donors?
Markets substituting for nonmarket transactions
If disapproval reflects the belief that organs should be given
by friends or family, people who disapprove of kidney mar-
kets may also disapprove of other purchases of services
otherwise given for free by loved ones (such as food prepa-
ration and child care). We presented paired market and non-
market scenarios. The questions for cooking and takeout
food are:
Background: John and Mary both work full time jobs,
and have successful careers. They have two school-
aged children. They are a prosperous middle class
family. Their jobs keep them quite busy, and John
and Mary are often too tired to cook a family meal.
Scenario A: Suppose that 3 to 4 nights a week John
and Mary have Mary’s sister Corrie come over to
make dinner. Do you approve or disapprove of John
and Mary having Corrie cook dinner instead of
making dinner themselves?
Scenario B: Suppose that 3 to 4 nights a week John
and Mary order take out or go out to restaurants
with their children. Do you approve or disapprove of
John and Mary buying dinner from a restaurant
instead of making dinner themselves?
By contrasting the two scenarios we can identify disap-
proval toward the market-based solution, rather than dis-
approval toward other aspects of the scenario (e.g. both
parents working). We also measured disapproval for pros-
titution, and promiscuity.
Markets generally
People who disapprove of kidney markets may simply re-
gard markets as generally exploitative. To assess this we
employ questions drawn from a survey of attitudes toward
capitalism and free markets (19). We measure agreement
with statements that markets cause ‘an unfair distribution
of income’, ‘rewards people fairly’, ‘lead to an efficient use
of resources’, ‘require a lot of government control’, and are
overall ‘fair and ethical’. Thus individuals who disapprove of
kidney markets may agree with the negative statements
and/or disagree with the positive ones.
Internet survey
We used the Zoomerang online survey panel of Market-
Tools, Inc (San Francisco, CA). MarketTools recruits 2.5
million potential participants through their website, as well
as targeted recruitment so that the panel is nationally repre-
sentative. Respondents earn points (worth approximately
$1) redeemable for prizes for each completed survey.
The survey was conducted in May 2008. A total of 8755
potential respondents 15 years or older were invited by
email to take the survey, with 575 (5.97%) accessing the
survey website. A total of 523 respondents completed the
survey, with a completion rate of 90.96%.
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Table 1: Summary of demographic variables of respondents
U.S.
Our sample population
Mean age 44.60 44.30
% Female 54.68% 52.4%
% White 79.5% 68.2%
% Black 7.5% 11.6%
% Asian 5.3% 4.6%
% Hispanic 6.1% 13.8%
% Married 56.21% 54.1%
Mean number of children 1.58 1.9
Median household income $50–$59K $50K
% Household income <
$30K
22.41% 25.69%
% Grade school or high
school education only
23.71% 48.42%
% College educated 39.96% 33.0%




% Republican 27.60% 39%
% Democrat 29.64% 32%
U.S. population data drawn from 2008 current population survey
(CPS), 2008 American religious identification survey (ARIS) and
2008 election exit polls. U.S. population data for individuals age
15+ where possible.
Internet surveys are an emerging methodology compared
to telephone surveys. Research describing their relative
performance is still developing. Initial studies suggest in-
ternet surveys do not introduce additional biases compared
to random digit phone surveys. Internet surveys often yield
response rates of less than 10% (20), and as low as 2%
(21,22). While nonresponse bias is always a concern, re-
search suggests that low response rates do not necessarily
indicate nonresponse bias (22,23).
Notably, Chang and Krasnick (24) and Berrens et al. (25)
each ran the same survey with both telephone and internet
samples. While Chang and Krasnick find the internet sam-
ple had somewhat greater demographic deviations from
the U.S. population, it was more accurate on a number of
dimensions including greater predictive validity, greater re-
liability and less social desirability bias. Berrens et al. find
that with demographic controls the opinions measured are
not significantly different between methodologies. Thus
while our sample is somewhat more educated than the
U.S. population (see Table 1), and has basic computer skills,
these comparative studies suggest our approval measures
may be largely representative. Nonresponse bias is also
mitigated in our survey because the solicitation email did
not include the topic, hence we would not expect respon-
ders to have different attitudes toward kidney markets than
nonresponders.
Data analysis
Table 1 summarizes the demographic characteristics of our
sample, which has broad enough coverage to identify the
impact of these variables.
Attitudes toward kidney markets
We begin by examining respondents’ overall support to-
ward kidney markets. Table 2, Panel A reports the per-
cent of respondents who approve and disapprove of each
market (i.e. the fraction who chose any of the three ‘ap-
prove’/’disapprove’ answers—the omitted category is ‘nei-
ther approve nor disapprove’). A majority approved of each
potential market; only between 16 and 27% disapproved.
Respondents were more favorable to markets involving
government or another institutional purchaser, rather than
individual patients buying kidneys directly. This difference
was significant for both living and deceased donors (using
a two-tailed t-test, p < 0.01 for both comparisons). While
attitudes toward legality show a similar large difference
between positive and negative ratings for payments from
the government (or insurance companies), individual mar-
kets have a much smaller difference (only 42–44% choose
‘legal’ compared to 31–35% choosing ‘illegal’). Respon-
dents’ policy preferences were slightly more negative than
their approval sentiments (shifting some respondents from
Table 2: Disapproval rates
Panel A: Kidney markets
Donor Purchaser Approve (%) Disapprove (%) Legal (%) Illegal (%) Modal rank
Deceased Individual 50.67 26.58 42.26 33.84 3
Deceased Government 62.72 15.87 57.55 16.83 1
Living Individual 54.49 22.75 44.17 31.17 4
Living Government 60.99 17.40 56.21 19.69 2
Panel B: Family and body transactions
Scenario Approve (%) Disapprove (%) Scenario Approve (%) Disapprove (%)
Sister cook food 46.85 23.90 Sex: prostitute 8.41 71.51
Order food 43.02 31.17 Pay for blood 68.07 11.85
Kids with grandma 79.54 6.12 Surrogacy 65.77 16.44
Kids in daycare 66.16 16.25 Buy body for medical 54.88 24.47
Elder care 65.20 16.25 Buy body for misc. 42.83 32.12
Sex: promiscuous 31.36 35.18
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positive to neutral and from neutral to negative). This could
be due to a bias toward the status quo, or consideration
for the attitudes of others who are more disapproving.
To consider what other responses correlate with disap-
proval of kidney markets, we use two dependent variables
to capture overall kidney disapproval. First, we sum the dis-
approval ratings to construct an aggregate measure of dis-
approval of kidney markets. (We weight responses equally,
because weights generated by factor analysis on each of
the four disapproval measures differed by less than 0.024.)
This aggregate measure had mean 13.1 and standard devi-
ation 5.7. We also construct a dummy variable that equals
one if the respondent disapproved of at least one of the
four markets. A total of 38% of respondents disapproved
of at least one market.
Demographics and personal experience
Respondents employed in healthcare have somewhat
higher total disapproval of kidney markets, although the
difference is insignificant (t-test p = 0.45), however they
are significantly more likely to disapprove of at least one
market (a difference of 8 percentage points, p = 0.05). Or-
gan donors are not more disapproving by either measure
(p = 0.67, p = 0.22, respectively). However, respondents
who know a transplant recipient are less disapproving over-
all (p = 0.04) and are 22 percentage points less likely to
disapprove of any such market (p = 0.04). Women are
somewhat more disapproving of kidney markets overall
(p = 0.04), although their likelihood of disapproving of at
least one market is not significantly different (p = 0.69).
There do not appear to be consistent patterns for race,
nor does disapproval decrease by income or any level of
education.
Religion and politics
Religiously active Christians are significantly more disap-
proving of kidney markets (p < 0.01), and are 14 per-
centage points more likely to disapprove of at least one
market (p < 0.01). A total of 92% of religiously active re-
spondents identified as Christian. Not enough respondents
identified as religiously active non-Christians to determine
their attitudes. To measure political attitudes, we elicit party
identification and identification as socially/economically lib-
eral/conservative. While we do not find a significant effect
of party affiliation, both social and economic conservatives
are significantly more disapproving of kidney markets (total
disapproval: p < 0.01 and p = 0.07, respectively), with so-
cial conservatives being 16 percentage points more likely
to disapprove of at least one market (p < 0.01) and eco-
nomic conservatives 12 percentage points more likely to
disapprove (p < 0.01).
Attitudes toward capitalism
If respondents dislike kidney markets because they think
markets generally are exploitative, then we should expect
people who agree with negative statements about markets
and/or disagree with positive statements to disapprove of
Table 3: Traditionally nonmarket and body-related transactions
(1) (2)
Total Disapprove of
Variables disapproval at least one
Food: family cooks −0.0680 (0.186) −0.0530 (0.0461)
Food: order takeout 0.473∗∗∗ (0.180) 0.0993∗∗ (0.0429)
Kids: family cares for 0.269 (0.218) −0.0115 (0.0568)
Kids: daycare 0.0248 (0.212) −0.0265 (0.0527)
Eldercare 0.0187 (0.173) −0.00609 (0.0455)
Sex: promiscuous 0.144 (0.170) 0.0624 (0.0446)
Sex: prostitute −0.198 (0.167) −0.0584 (0.0472)
Pay for blood 0.629∗∗∗ (0.198) 0.0352 (0.0445)
Pay for surrogacy 0.616∗∗∗ (0.172) 0.0810∗ (0.0437)
Pay for deceased
donors (Medical)
0.497∗∗ (0.206) 0.0836∗ (0.0499)
Pay for deceased
donors (Misc)







Constant 4.836∗∗∗ (1.540) −1.764∗∗∗ (0.442)
Observations 415 415
R-squared 0.280
Column 1 is OLS, Column 2 is Probit.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
kidney markets more. However, we find either no relation-
ship or the opposite relationship. Respondents who agree
that markets lead to unequal outcomes (an antimarket atti-
tude) are less disapproving of kidney markets with marginal
significance (p = 0.08), as are respondents who agree that
markets need to be strongly controlled (p = 0.07). In addi-
tion, neither agreeing with specific promarket statements,
nor having an overall favorable impression of markets, are
significantly related to attitudes toward kidney markets.
Hence there is no pattern that antimarket attitudes predict
disapproval of kidney markets.
Family and body transaction scenarios
We now examine whether disapproval of kidney markets
is related to more general repugnance, either toward com-
moditization of other body parts or toward other forms of
market encroachment on traditionally nonmarket mecha-
nisms. Table 2 Panel B shows approval and disapproval of
each of the scenarios relating to family and body transac-
tions. Only prostitution elicits majority disapproval. Disap-
proval of kidney markets is less than disapproval of fre-
quently ordering takeout food, is greater than disapproval
for paying blood donors and comparable to the disapproval
of paying surrogate mothers and purchasing deceased
donors for medical purposes.
To assess whether disapproval toward kidney markets is re-
lated to either disapproval of market transactions for bodies
and/or other typically nonmarket interactions, we regress
kidney disapproval on disapproval toward the other sce-
narios (Table 3). Significant positive coefficients indicate
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disapproval of the specific scenario is correlated with dis-
approving of kidney markets.
Disapproval toward scenarios representing both hypothe-
ses is significantly correlated with disapproval toward kid-
ney markets. Three transactions relating to body parts
are significant when looking at total disapproval, with
two of them (surrogacy and deceased donors) also being
marginally significant for disapproving of at least one mar-
ket. The effects are large. The first specification indicates
that, for any of the three body scenarios, if we compared
respondents who strongly approved of the body scenario
with respondents who strongly disapproved we would ex-
pect the latter group to have a larger total disapproval to-
ward kidney markets between 3.12 and 3.79 points (an
increase of between 0.52 and 0.66 standard deviations in
the total kidney disapproval measure). Similarly, the second
specification indicates that if we compared respondents
who strongly approved of the surrogacy scenario or de-
ceased donor scenario to those who strongly disapproved
the latter group would be 22 percentage points more likely
to disapprove of at least one of the kidney markets.
Disapproval toward one of the scenarios relating to tra-
ditionally nonmarket transactions is also significantly cor-
related: respondents who disapprove of the busy parents
who consistently eat out or order takeout rather than cook-
ing for their children are significantly more disapproving
of kidney markets. The effect size is again large: respon-
dents who strongly disapprove of the takeout scenario are
estimated to disapprove of kidney markets by 2.85 more
points than respondents who strongly approve of the take-
out scenario (an increase of 0.50 standard deviations in the
total kidney disapproval measure). Those who strongly dis-
approve of the takeout scenario are 23 percentage points
more likely to disapprove of at least one kidney market
compared to those who strongly approve of the takeout
scenario. Note that disapproval for the corresponding sce-
nario with a nonmarket solution (having a family member
cook) does not significantly predict disapproval for kidney
markets (and in fact has a coefficient near zero). This sug-
gests that the connection between disapproval for eating
out/ordering takeout and disapproval for kidney markets
is coming from the use of the market rather than other
features of the scenario (such as both parents working).
The coefficients on the religion and politics variables are
no longer significant when included alongside disapproval
toward these scenarios. This suggests that these general
ideologies are important in predicting attitudes toward kid-
ney markets as proxies for the more particular attitudes to-
ward body-related or traditionally nonmarket transactions.
Comparing general objections to policy concerns
We now want to compare the importance of general con-
cerns about repugnant transactions to concerns about spe-
cific policy details in influencing attitudes toward kidney
markets. We identify respondents as ‘sensitive to repug-
nance’ if they disapprove of at least one of the four signif-
icant scenarios (takeout food, blood donations, surrogacy,
medical deceased donors). A total of 68% of respondents
who disapprove of kidney markets are sensitive to repug-
nance (significantly more than the 51% who do not dis-
approve of kidney markets; Fisher’s exact test p < 0.01).
We identify respondents as ‘sensitive to policy details’ if
they consistently rate both the individual markets higher
or lower than the corresponding government markets, or
if they rate both the living donor markets higher or lower
than the corresponding deceased donor markets. Note that
a respondent can be policy sensitive whether or not they
disapprove of any kidney market. A total of 60% of respon-
dents who disapprove of kidney markets are sensitive to
policy details (significantly more than the 26% who do
not disapprove of kidney markets; p < 0.01). Therefore,
among those who disapprove of kidney markets at least
as many respondents are concerned with repugnant trans-
actions (68%) as are concerned with policy details (60%).
Moreover, among kidney market disapprovers caring about
repugnance and caring about policy details are negatively
correlated (q = −0.21, p = 0.002).
Are food- and body-related disapproval distinct?
We now demonstrate that body-related transactions and
family food preparation represent two distinct predictors
of kidney disapproval. First, while the correlation between
the takeout food scenario and each of the body scenarios
is significant, they are all small (q between 0.05 and 0.15).
Second, among respondents who are sensitive to repug-
nance, many disapprove of only the takeout food scenario
or only one of the body scenarios. Specifically, of the re-
spondents who disapprove of kidney markets, 21% disap-
prove of both the takeout food scenario and at least one
of the body scenarios, 17% disapprove of only the takeout
food scenario, 30% disapprove of only one or more of the
body scenarios, and 32% disapprove of neither.
Moreover, respondents who disapprove of the market in-
fringing on family food preparation have different religious
and political characteristics than respondents who disap-
prove of body-related transactions. Religiously active Chris-
tians are not significantly more likely to disapprove of or-
dering takeout (t-test p = 0.42), but are strongly more
disapproving of paying for blood, surrogate mothers and
deceased donors for medical purposes (p < 0.01, p < 0.01,
p = 0.02 respectively). In addition, social conservatives do
not have stronger views on takeout food (p = 0.39), while
they do significantly disapprove of all three body related
markets (p = 0.02, p < 0.01, p < 0.01). Similarly, being an
economic conservative has no relationship with attitudes
toward takeout food (p = 0.93), while it predicts disap-
proval of the body related markets (p < 0.01 for all three).
Thus, while many respondents disapprove of both the take-
out food scenario and body-related market scenarios, the
questions measure two distinct attitudes.
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Discussion
We find that a majority of our respondents approve of each
of the four kidney markets we describe, while a substan-
tial minority disapproves of at least one potential market.
A similar majority favors the legality of having the govern-
ment and/or insurance companies give a standard payment
to donors; a plurality also would like an individual market to
be legal, but nearly as many want such markets to be ille-
gal. While recent surveys of the ASTS (7) and the public (10)
find much greater disapproval of cash payments to donors,
our results are in many ways congruent with theirs. In
Rodrigue et al. (7) nearly 65% of transplant surgeons fa-
vor an income tax credit for donors, while in Boulware
et al. (10) between 28% and 41% approve payments or
tax credits to living donors from either government or their
employer. Our methodology of describing scenarios with a
hypothetical patient is closest to Guttmann and Guttmann
(11); they also find a majority of the public (between 69%
and 74%) in favor of allowing a patient to pay a living donor.
They found much lower approval among physicians and
transplant specialists (between 21% and 43% approval).
The 2007 Harris poll (13) also found similar results to
ours, with 49% in favor of living donors receiving financial
compensation.
We caution that surveys responses can be influenced
by question wording, hence we tried to avoid emotive
contexts. The most reliable information comes from within-
survey comparisons of responses to the different low con-
text questions we ask, rather than between-survey com-
parisons, or attempts to assess absolute rates of particular
views within the population. Thus while a large minority
of our respondents disapprove of markets for kidneys, it is
more informative to note that this is much less than the
rate of disapproval of prostitution, comparable to the rate
of disapproval of hiring a surrogate mother, and more than
the rate of disapproval for buying blood.
We mainly explore the relationship between disapproval
of kidney markets and other attitudes. We consider three
hypotheses. First, this disapproval is part of a general dis-
approval of the sale and commoditization of body parts.
Second, it reflects a disapproval of the encroachment of
markets on traditionally nonmarket transactions. Third, dis-
approval of kidney sales reflects distrust of markets gener-
ally. Because we are comparing answers to similarly con-
structed questions, the resulting correlations should reflect
patterns of attitudes in the population. However our survey
cannot identify causation.
The responses support the first two hypotheses, as inde-
pendent predictors of disapproval of kidney sales, but fail
to support the third. Disapproval of sales of blood, surro-
gate wombs and deceased donors for anatomy study is a
predictor of disapproval of markets for kidneys. These ef-
fects are strong—increasing the likelihood of disapproving
of a kidney market by more than 20 percentage points.
A second predictor of disapproval of kidney markets is dis-
approval of ordering takeout food instead of cooking at
home, where again this attitude increases the likelihood of
disapproving of a kidney market by more than 20 percent-
age points. Moreover, disapproval of ordering takeout food
predicts disapproval of kidney markets in a different subset
of people than disapproval of markets involving other body
parts.
Finally, distaste for kidney markets does not arise from
distaste for markets generally. On the contrary, people
who disapprove of kidney markets tend to approve of mar-
kets generally. (Both disapproving of kidney markets and
approving of markets generally are positively corre-
lated with identifying as socially conservative and/or
Republican.)
The shortage of transplant kidneys has spurred extensive
debate about monetary markets. Our results suggest both
that the general public may be open to some form of mon-
etary compensation to kidney donors, and that the oppo-
sition to such markets reflects not only specific concerns
about policy details but that a substantial minority find kid-
ney markets repugnant, that is they disapprove of others
taking part in them.
We find majority approval of each kidney market, though a
majority supports legality only for markets with the govern-
ment or insurance companies as purchaser. This suggests
that monetary compensation to donors by institutional in-
termediaries could receive public support. Both general
disapproval of body-related markets and disapproval of mar-
ket encroachment on traditionally nonmarket spheres con-
tribute to disapproval of kidney markets; however we find
no evidence that generally negative attitudes toward mar-
kets drive this repugnance. Social conservatism and being
a religiously active Christian also predict of kidney market
disapproval, though largely as proxies for general disap-
proval for body-related markets. Furthermore, disapproval
for kidney markets seems driven by concerns about repug-
nant transactions at least as much as sensitivity to specific
policy details. Unless proposals engage these fundamen-
tal concerns, perhaps by addressing the long-term welfare
of kidney providers, they will fail to address the objections
of a substantial minority.
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